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SUMMARY
Industrial forest concessions cover about 45 million hectares in Central Africa. This paper discusses the weaknesses of the current concession 
model and initiatives for helping it evolve; it then proposes a new type of concession, entitled ‘Concessions 2.0’, adapted to the future 
challenges presented by the overlapping among the rights and modes of the harvesting of multiple resources. This proposed model is based on 
four features: (i) mapping and recognition of the customary territories within and around the industrial concession, (ii) timber revenue sharing 
indexed on the extension of the customary territories and contractual management agreements within the communities, (iii) allowance of 
commercial exploitation of non-timber resources by entitled claimers under the supervision and/or in association with the concessionaire, and 
(iv) inclusive governance for the management of overlapping rights over the concession area.
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Vers des Concessions 2.0: articuler gestion inclusive et exclusive dans les forêts de production 
en Afrique centrale
A. KARSENTY et C. VERMEULEN
Les concessions forestières industrielles couvrent environ 45 millions d’hectares en Afrique centrale. Cet article analyse les faiblesses 
du modèle concessionnaire actuel et les initiatives qui contribuent à le faire évoluer. Il propose donc un nouveau type de concession, nommé 
‘Concession 2.0’ qui prenne en compte les réalités de la superposition des droits et des modes d’utilisation de ressources multiples. Le modèle 
proposé possède quatre caractéristiques: (i) la cartographie et la reconnaissances des espaces coutumiers au sein et autour de la concession 
industrielle, (ii) un partage des revenus de l’exploitation du bois indexé sur l’importance des surfaces coutumières incluses dans la concession 
et des accords contractuels de gestion avec les communautés, (iii) la possibilité d’exploitation commerciale de ressources autres que le bois 
d’œuvre par différents ayants droit en association et sous la supervision du concessionnaire, et (iv) une gouvernance inclusive pour la gestion 
des droits superposés dans l’espace de la concession.
Hacia las ‘Concesiones 2.0’: Articulando una gestión inclusiva y exclusiva en los bosques 
madereros de África Central
A. KARSENTY y C. VERMEULEN
Las concesiones forestales industriales cubren aproximadamente 45 millones de hectáreas en la región de África Central. El presente artículo 
discute las debilidades del modelo actual de concesión industrial y presenta una propuesta para hacerlo evolucionar. Así, se presenta un nuevo 
modelo de concesión industrial bajo el lema de ‘Concesión 2.0’, con el objetivo de hacer frente a los desafíos que emergen de la superposición 
de los derechos y modos de uso de sus múltiples recursos. Este nuevo modelo de concesión se caracterizaría por los cuatro componentes siguien-
tes: (i) el mapeo y el reconocimiento de los territorios tradicionales dentro y alrededor de las concesiones industriales; (ii) el reparto de 
los beneficios de la venta de madera en base a la extensión de los territorios tradicionales y bajo un acuerdo contractual con las comunidades; 
(iii) la autorización de explotar recursos no madereros por sus usuarios legítimos bajo la supervisión y/o en asociación con el concesionario; y 
(iv) el diseño de una gobernanza inclusiva con respecto a los derechos que se encuentren superpuestos dentro de la concesión.
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are appearing more frequently in Forest Management Units 
(FMU), outside of the agricultural areas planned as part of 
the management plans. Influential people in the local govern-
ments (politicians) sometimes set up their palm oil or cocoa 
plantations within forest concessions and concession-holders 
find it difficult to get local authorities to help remove them.
Legislation has been passed to promote some sharing of 
operating profits with the people in Cameroon, Gabon, and 
Congo Brazzaville. This pertains to the repayment of 200 
to 1,000 FCFA per harvested cubic meter (up to € 1.5) to the 
so-called ‘local residents’. These amounts are to be paid in the 
form of investments in social welfare and local development 
projects. Though these payments give the appearance of a 
more equitable sharing of the harvested resources, they have 
changed nothing in terms of governance. Most laws provide 
for minimal public participation in forest management, of 
which the ‘forest-peasants committees’ of Cameroon are 
the archetype. Characterised by participation in the form of 
information and consultation and sometimes paid participa-
tion in activities, they still struggle to achieve these objectives 
(Kouedji et al. 2015). The ‘social’ criteria for international 
certification standards such as the Forest Stewardship Council 
(FSC) focus primarily on improving the living conditions and 
rights of the ‘beneficiaries’ (e.g. health, education, rights of 
workers and their families), securing land rights, indigenous 
peoples’ issues, and reducing the developmental impact on 
local communities’ ways of life (e.g. preservation of Non-
Timber Forest Products (NTFPs), social areas dedicated to 
the preservation of cultural sites). They do not focus on 
improving governance through the sharing of responsibilities 
or the co-management of natural resources.
This paper discusses the weaknesses of the current 
concession model and initiatives for helping it evolve; it then 
proposes a new type of concession, entitled ‘Concessions 
2.0’, adapted to the future challenges presented by the over-
lapping among the rights and modes of the harvesting of 
multiple resources.
LANDHOLDINGS AND LANDS RIGHTS: MAPPING 
CHALLENGES
Moving away from the ‘zero-sum game’ logic
In much of rural Africa, and especially in the pastoral and 
forest areas, the ratio of rural communities to space is a social 
ratio of a type other than the “geometric” ratio of the modern 
territory. In a forest environment, various peoples are located 
within a space based on a network of trails through the 
medium of different activities and with the help of “topocen-
tric” landmarks.1 On the other hand, knowledge of a space in 
INTRODUCTION
Industrial forest concessions cover about 45 million hectares 
in Central Africa and have existed since the nineteenth 
century. The principle of concession clearly differentiates 
between the right of logging, the only one granted in princi-
ple, and that of ownership, which is not transferred to the 
concession holder. In modern concessions, the status confers 
a fundamental right onto its beneficiary: the exclusive right 
to harvest one or more products within a given boundary and 
for a fixed period. Legally, this logging right is a use right 
separate from ownership of the area and covers only the 
products for which it was granted. In the forest concession, 
it is the exclusive timber logging right that is transferred in 
accordance with regulations and specifications that may be 
specific to each concession.
These concessions are considered by some analysts as a 
legacy of the colonial period (Alden Wily 2012), and many 
NGOs would like to see them replaced by community forests 
and small timber logging-processing companies (Macqueen 
2008). However, the community forests of Central Africa 
have been very disappointing in terms of sustainable manage-
ment (Cuny 2011, for Cameroon), and the meta-analysis of 
the literature in Robinson et al. (2011) highlights an ‘associa-
tion between the negative results in terms of management and 
forests managed by the communities in Africa’. For small 
artisanal businesses operating within a legal framework, 
autonomy is also problematic. As soon as transportation 
and logging costs increase, the feasibility of independent 
community forests without a partnership with a nearby con-
cession-holder becomes weak, simply for economic reasons 
(Ezzine de Blas et al. 2009). In sparsely populated and 
isolated forest areas, an industrial concession is often one of 
the few structures that can organise economic activities by 
creating their own production and logistics environment 
(Singer and Karsenty 2009). However, industrial concessions 
are found in environments that evolve more or less rapidly 
under the pressure of increasing population density and agri-
business investments that are encouraged by the governments, 
sometimes at the expense of the forests (Ongolo 2015). In 
concessions where legal rules are followed, the profitability 
of logging companies is reduced, as primary and near primary 
forests have reached the end of the logging cycle and costs 
of ‘compliance with rules’ or certification are applied. 
Profitability clearly lies with the agribusiness plantations, and 
the legal status of the land (permanent forest estate) is often 
all that prevents or inhibits the conversion of logged forests.
Furthermore, the demands on land from local people are 
increasingly being felt in countries where the rural population 
density is significant – mainly in the DRC and in many parts 
of Cameroon and Southern Congo. Food and perennial crops 
1
 In the topocentric perspective, a concept inspirited by P. Bohannan (1963), “space is made up of nodes and forces, with hazy boundaries” 
(IIED 2000). “The land is organised around specific points from which are exercised various powers over the spirits, water, land, and trees or 
over people or minerals. These powers are associated with different strengths based on date of settlement, conquest, form of land use and so 
on”. Thus, there may be a variety of rights which operate over the same space and overlap, (Le Roy 1991: 314). The geometric perspective 
requires clear boundaries and attaches importance to maps.
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modern representations is based on the knowledge of the 
space’s boundaries, which helps in classifying it and possibly 
allocating it. The ‘modern’ lies, therefore, in the space based 
on geometric landmarks obtained through the mapped repre-
sentation and the technical possibility of locating oneself on 
the basis of perpendicular lines – the latitude and longitude. 
By contrast, in many rural societies, and particularly in forest 
societies, the knowledge of a space comes with the knowl-
edge of places. It is these places (e.g. meadows, old fields, 
ponds, trees) that give structure to an open space. Distance 
from the usual living and activity areas is the most important 
factor in ownership. Land ownership in the strict sense 
pertains to only a small part of the space used in daily life. 
It pertains to fields, which are generally quite close to the 
huts, fallow lands, land reserves, future clearings, and places 
earmarked for family groups or identified communities. 
These modes of land ownership can be translated in terms of 
exclusive control given to one or several groups. Beyond this, 
land controls give way to ownership modes of gathering 
and hunting resources, which involve the control of space to 
varying degrees. The ground is no longer a priority object 
to be controlled but acts as a medium for hunting, gathering, 
and extraction activities. These activities are a part of spaces 
with variable configurations, which cannot be assigned any 
defined boundaries but are structured by topocentric repre-
sentations, such as distance from the village, rivers, lowlands, 
meadows, large trees used as landmarks, and proximity to the 
nearby village. Partial recovery of these spaces, related to the 
interdependence of hunting, fishing, and gathering activities, 
creates familiarity and an identifiable zone of influence 
(Karsenty and Marie 1998). 
On the one hand, we sense the implications of generalis-
ing the territorial return in terms of the insecurity of a number 
of players who find their place only in the interlinking of 
spaces and in specific access to the resources local modes of 
ownership allow. For example, the tradition of semi-nomadic 
hunters, though few in number and partially settled. On the 
other hand, can we give up on trying to represent the spatial 
projection of controls exercised on spaces and resources 
by these people on a ‘modern’ medium? In current decision-
making processes, mapping is a means of identifying the 
players needed to take them into account in state management 
techniques:
“New forms created by economic regulation invent new 
rules of space wherein it can be suggested that ‘places’ 
take precedence over territory and coordination takes 
precedence over demarcation” (Badie 1995, p. 182 – 
translated).
Will we be able to think about forest space management 
by organising coordination in the use of various players 
who employ different resources from the same environment, 
or should we persevere with the land-spared development 
models based on a territoriality principle in contradiction with 
the local representations? To represent internal relationships 
of ownership and the use of resources on a physical medium, 
networks need to be mapped to reflect a space organisation 
understood as relationships between places that govern one 
topocentric space or more. On the other hand, to organise 
external relationships and use negotiation for problems the 
administration cannot handle other than by ‘slicing’ space, 
the ‘geometric’ representation of village landholdings with 
boundaries identifiable on a map can be a good tool, if one 
can precisely define for what it should and should not be used.
Mapping initiatives and their foreseeable effects
Mapping, whether participatory or not, of land and village 
landholdings is an age-old practice. While it initially took a 
geographer’s approach to produce measurable boundaries 
and areas to help produce other variables, such as population 
density, it later switched to the mapping of points in Central 
Africa corresponding precisely to places of the topocentric 
ownership of resource spaces. Several projects designed to 
promote community forestry in Cameroon (Karsenty et al. 
1997, Vermeulen 1997) and Gabon (Schippers et al. 2008) 
have made the mapping of landholdings a prerequisite for 
action, a point of adversarial debate useful for collaborative 
demarcation of community forests. 
In Gabon, this province-wide initiative led to the creation 
of the dedicated encoding software Map Village (Morin et al. 
2014) and a specific database, which was passed on to several 
forest concession-holders so that they could incorporate these 
aspects into the design of their facilities and thus reduce 
conflicts with villagers. In the same vein, the mapping of the 
living areas of the Pygmies in Northern Congo in the CIB 
forest concession (Hopkin 2007) by the players themselves 
equipped with cybertrackers should help in mapping their 
journeys within the concessions and particularly in identify-
ing the resources on which they depend and thereby protect 
them from exploitation. This approach has been compared 
with the NTFPs and approaches employed by experts based 
on participatory mapping (Vermeulen et al. 2009). More 
recently, initiatives oriented toward the large-scale online 
mapping of land and landholdings have been developed by 
NGOs. These include the Mapping For Rights2 initiative, 
which asks the communities themselves (in principle) to 
prove their presence in a given forest area to enable policy-
makers and the private sector to recognise this presence and 
help State authorities recognise the rights related to it. It is 
also worth noting that the approach promoted by the Rights 
and Resources Initiative3 involves the measurement of areas 
held across the planet based on traditional rights, recognises 
collective rights on lands and forests, and offers the private 
sector a guide for how to take this into consideration. 
In both these examples, the goal is not simply to document 
the areas occupied but to deduce traditional rights from them, 
2
 http://map.mappingforrights.org/. 
3
 http://www.rightsandresources.org/. 
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management is complex. Although the associations are meant 
to allow collective action and local democracy, they are very 
poorly used by villagers, who are unaware of their rules 
or who bypass them. This result in several conflicts within 
community forests (refer particularly to Ezzine de Blas et al. 
2011). Many authors, including Cuny (2011), have also 
highlighted the negative influence of community elites, who 
have often taken over community forestry to exploit it to 
their financial or political advantage. 
The unlikely autonomy in remote areas
Another major obstacle in the development of community 
forests is their remoteness. Far away from administrative 
decision-making bodies and trading places, most community 
forests are commercially at the mercy of operators, most 
of them illegal, who travel across the poorly connected rural 
areas in search of timber. Isolated and weakly positioned, the 
communities negotiate badly and often without any knowl-
edge of the market prices. The subcontracting agreements are 
unconscionable and often result in illegal activities, for which 
the communities are held responsible (Julve et al. 2013). 
Initiatives aimed at commercially linking community forests 
to concession-holders have seen the light of day (Vermeulen 
et al. 2006), but the traceability requirements associated with 
the certification process have nullified these attempts.
Community forests: a way to ‘confine’ people?
In countries where they have been set up, community forests 
can also be seen as a way of sidelining people from the heart 
of forest management. Confined to managing the areas 
adjoining the concessions, local people must settle for 
restricted rights of use within the concessions and their 
extremely theoretical implication in developing the manage-
ment plan.
DECLINE OF THE TRADITIONNAL CONCESSIONARY 
MODEL
End of logging cycles in quasi-primary forests and the 
need for new investments 
The profitability of legal forest logging is declining. Very 
few forests that remain available for logging have not been 
logged at least once, albeit often with high selectivity, target-
ing a couple of species of great commercial value. Congo 
Brazzaville, CAR (Central African Republic), and Gabon 
feature some blocks of unlogged forests within concessions, 
but logging is now essentially carried out in more or less 
‘secondary’ forests. The increasing scarcity of some of the 
most popular commercial species in the markets has not 
resulted in a corresponding increase in prices but in deferred 
purchases for substitutes – other tropical or temperate timber, 
or other materials. 
In an industry used to logging a couple of iconic species 
(e.g. Okoumé (Aucoumea klaineana Pierre), Sapelli (Entan-
drophragma cylindricum), Ayous (Triplochiton scleroxylon), 
Azobé (Lophira alata), the transition will be difficult. The 
enforceable on the state or the private sector for future zoning 
or classification processes in line with the principle of free 
and informed prior consent. We must remember that, while 
not all these initiatives have legal grounds in the countries 
concerned, they are nevertheless not devoid of political 
effects. Exploitation of these mapping products beyond the 
role that was initially assigned to them is inevitable.
Difficulties of existing community forests
A subordinate role coupled with unbearable administrative 
constraints
The legal frameworks of several Central African countries 
provide for the creation of ‘community forests’, which can be 
defined as a decentralised form of forest management at 
the village or community level, sometimes as a devolution 
process (as in Cameroon or Gabon) or a decentralised process 
(as contemplated in DRC, where “decentralised territorial 
entities” are involved for some categories of permits). Intro-
duced on the ground in Cameroon in 1996, they constitute the 
cornerstone of effective local participation in forest manage-
ment – in principle. In fact, within the concessions, only 
‘rights of use’ (right of way, right to hunt or right to gather) 
are traditionally recognised by Central African laws. These 
community forests are generally characterised by modest 
areas ranging from 5,000 to 10,000 ha and by small timber 
wealth, given their location by the roadside in a more or less 
degraded forested area. To date, only Cameroon and Gabon 
have set up community forests on the ground. Lessons learned 
from this implementation are drawn primarily from the 
Cameroonian experience, which is over 20 years old.
Run by and for the local people, these forests should, in 
theory, be managed by the latter on the basis of a simple man-
agement plan accessible to them – an enormous challenge, as 
farmers–hunters–gatherers are being asked to turn themselves 
into forest managers. There is constant native tension between 
the legislators’ will to ensure sustainable management of 
these areas modelled on the lines of large concessions (with 
their inventory norms, national standards, and rotations over 
time and space) and the desire to delegate forest management 
to local people with none of the requisite skills. Moreover, 
the obligation to involve them in a forest estate deemed 
non-permanent and on the fringes of industrial concessions 
has marginalised them at the outset in terms of access to the 
resource. Finally, administrative texts of rare complexity 
punctuate the painful journey of candidate communities.
Difficulties of collective action and the trend of ‘elite’ 
capture
Setting up community forests requires the creation of a formal 
organisation that represents all community constituents 
who can legally make a commitment in its name. Cameroon 
has four types of organisational entity – associations, coop-
eratives, Common Initiative Groups (CIG), and Economic 
Interest Groups (EIG). However, woodlands are often already 
owned by family groups, who do not always agree that 
management should become associative. In addition, the 
functioning of associations as a basis for community forest 
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very high-selectivity logging in Central Africa suggests the 
possibility of other cutting cycles with a change in the 
composition of crops by using other species. Investments in 
production and marketing facilities will be needed to trans-
form and promote the species deemed secondary and whose 
prices are too low to finance these investments. However, 
these investments are hampered by the limited profitability 
and uncertainty in the sustainability of concessions. Signifi-
cant changes have affected the ownership of Central African 
concessions in recent years. Millions of hectares of conces-
sions have changed hands through the sale of the assets 
of iconic companies, such as Siforco (Danzer Group) in the 
DRC, SBL (a family-owned company), and Olam-Bois (a 
multinational company of Indian origin) in Gabon, Reef (an 
FSC-certified company) in Cameroon, and the CIB company 
in Northern Congo, which has changed owners several times 
over a decade. Other large companies would be willing to 
transfer their assets to potential buyers. While other compa-
nies are emerging (such as the Rougier Group, now operating 
in four Central African countries), low profitability is being 
cited by vendors to justify their withdrawal. While, unlike 
in the 2000s, tax is no longer a subject of stress for the 
enterprises,4 the companies that are actively implementing 
their development plan (including the attached social specifi-
cations) have generally invested in legality certification and a 
traceability system, or in ‘good forest management’ certifica-
tion (through the FSC system). The costs of these measures 
are significant, and measures restricting or prohibiting the 
export of logs (as in Gabon since 2010), often a key segment 
of overall profitability, have eroded profit margins. 
The ‘emerging’ state policies relying on agribusiness
Central African governments have adopted development 
plans based on slogans about the ‘emergence’ of their coun-
tries, a rhetoric that has replaced ‘development’ and ‘sustain-
able development’, even if it is questionable that the latter 
was truly focussed upon. These governments believe they 
must follow the model of South-East Asian countries, whose 
economic success is interpreted as having resulted from 
the large-scale exploitation of their natural resources and the 
conversion of their forest areas into palm oil and rubber plan-
tations.5 The timber industry is perceived as a low-income 
activity, in contrast to the turnover that the perennial crop 
plantations can generate.
While, 15 years ago, barriers to agribusiness investment 
(e.g. poor state of infrastructure, availability of land, lack of 
labour) were road blocks to the development of planted areas, 
increases in the prices of palm oil and rubber, combined 
with investors’ need to find new land in order to continue 
their development, have entailed a new dynamic. Though 
the obstacles have not disappeared, growth in agribusiness 
plantations is tangible in Cameroon and, to a lesser extent, in 
the Congo and Gabon (Feintrenie 2014). Returns per hectare 
clearly favour the agribusiness plantations (Lescuyer et al. 
2014), and often only the legal status of the land (permanent 
forest estate, when it is legally established) prevents or 
inhibits the conversion of logged forests.
Governments openly support the development of peren-
nial crop plantations and often accede to the demands of 
industrialists who prefer setting up their plantations on forest-
lands to avoid incurring great expense in restoring degraded 
land outside the forests. In Cameroon, the government is 
refusing to finalise the gazetting process of several FMUs 
(concessions) to avoid the difficulties of further de-gazetting 
should these lands be assigned subsequently to agricultural 
use (Ongolo and Karsenty 2015). 
Concessions eroded by various forms of farming and 
artisanal activities
Due to population growth and the lack of major changes in 
agricultural practices, the areas cleared annually are increas-
ing with population density. It is not only the food needs, but 
cash crops such as cocoa and palm oil. Agribusiness firms 
have easy recourse to outsourcing to ensure a part of their 
supply, in a contractual form or otherwise.
Since the 1980s, the ‘‘outwards-looking’ of the wood 
industry has become more marked. While, initially, the 
industry diverted a significant part of their production to the 
domestic markets of some of these countries (see Topa et al. 
2010 for Cameroon), the erosion of the people’s purchasing 
power and the rising costs of legal logging combined to spur 
the development of artisanal sawing activities, which now 
largely feed the domestic markets. These activities are not 
technically illegal, but this informal sector has been develop-
ing on the fringes of the law due to regulatory framework 
failures (e.g. available permits, control systems). Sometimes, 
more-or-less-equipped artisanal operators (the border with 
the semi-industrial sector is often vague) operate in industrial 
concessions and clear out plots of species not yet logged by 
the concessionaire. In other cases, it is the community forests 
that bear the brunt of the illegal nature of this sector.
Supporting points against deforestation?
In Central Africa, deforestation is not linked with the pres-
ence of forest concessions, although roads and tracks created 
by logging are potential access roads for farmers and facilitate 
the marketing of their products. Without any demand on 
land, the result of a combination of an increasing population 
density and specific agricultural practices, forest tracks 
(which should be closed by the company after the end of 
the logging cycle, usually two years for one felling plot) are 
hardly used, and vegetation takes over these spaces6.
4
 Many of them have negotiated special tax agreements with the authorities or local governments to reduce their taxes. And the tax level has 
not been updated in spite of inflation.
5
 Setting aside the other conditions required for development – the economic and monetary policies that allowed capital accumulation through 
reinvestment and the educational systems favourable for the emergence of a middle class.
6
 The average life-span of most logging roads is less than four years, after which they are completely covered by vegetation composed of 
pioneer species. Twenty years later, these roads are no longer visible on Landsat satellite images (Kleinschroth et al. 2015).
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One can observe empirically that the countries and 
regions that are home to the most extensive concession areas 
and have the highest timber production, such as Gabon and 
Northern Congo, are also those with the lowest deforestation 
rates in Central Africa7. Their common point is low popula-
tion densities, especially in non-urban areas. In the DRC, 
a study on the drivers of deforestation drew two important 
conclusions:
“[T]he presence of a forest concession and mining opera-
tion does not seem to play a role in the deforestation/
degradation, at least at the national and sub-national levels 
that were studied. . .[I]t is above all the size of the popula-
tion which determines the quantity of forests affected by 
deforestation and degradation. These very clear results 
contradict several more local studies that have often high-
lighted the distance from roads and the importance of the 
flows linked to the roads as the main cause of deforesta-
tion”. (Defourny et al. 2011, p. 53 – translated).
Regarding wildlife, studies have shown that elephant num-
bers were sometimes higher in some major certified conces-
sions than in adjacent protected areas (Stokes et al. 2010). 
About gorillas, Haurez et al. (2013, 2015) states that in the 
absence of poaching, the gorilla population in the western 
lowlands seems resilient to selective logging in Central 
Africa (p. i) and specifies that the results show that a viable 
population of gorillas can be maintained in a selectively 
logged forest (< 2 trees ha). If wildlife is protected by a sus-
tained anti-poaching strategy, forest concessions have a major 
role to play in a landscape-level conservation policy.
Forest concessions finally structure the remote and sparsely 
populated territories, where the state struggles to bring in 
development and public services and to provide control over 
access to resources. Therefore, they have an important role to 
play in deforestation-reduction policies in protected areas and 
in sustainably managed community forests.
From timber to the exploitation of a whole set of resources 
One measure that would reduce the profitability gap between 
forest concessions and agricultural concessions is permitting 
the harvesting of resources other than wood. A developed 
concession is a large area consisting of forests, savannah, 
wetlands, and areas degraded by fires and is therefore home 
to a great diversity of resources. Due to regulatory rotation 
constraints (generally 25 or 30 years), only a fraction of the 
wooded area is logged each year. Since the law permits the 
opening of a maximum of two annual felling plots (which will 
subsequently be closed for the entire duration of the rotation), 
only 2/25 or 2/30 of the area is logged each year for timber, 
leaving the possibility of exploiting some of the resources in 
the plots that have already been logged or those expected to 
be logged later. The overlapping of timber ‘logging rights’ 
and wildlife harvesting rights through safari hunting has 
already been tested in Cameroon (Bigombé et al. 2005). 
In Republic of Congo, the CIB entered into an agreement in 
September 2015 (under the aegis of the Ministry of Forests) 
with a safari company whereby it can develop sport hunting 
on one of the CIB FMUs in accordance with FSC standards. 
In early 2016, the government expressed the intention to 
extend this joint use to other concessions.
Other resources can be exploited. Non-wood products 
with high added-value (like the okoumé sap in Gabon) or with 
a significant national market (such as the Irvingia gabonensis 
almond in Cameroon) could form the basis of commodity 
chains combining processing and promotion in urban or 
export markets. Degraded areas could be restored and 
exploited through wood plantations or perennial crops. A part 
of the wood waste could be exploited through industrial coal 
production (where transport costs make this profitable). 
However, these resources are already partly used by the 
local people in the concessions and are significant sources of 
revenue of which they cannot be deprived. On the contrary, 
these activities would need financial, technical, and organisa-
tional support to increase their added value. The presence of 
a timber logging industrial company can be an important asset 
in this regard, provided the institutional framework of the 
concession can be upgraded and the concession-holders are 
allowed to expand their range of activities to other products as 
part of a co-management process.
From sharing of logging revenues to joint governance 
of the concession?
Regulatory changes in profit-sharing
Sharing forest logging profits with local residents is not a new 
topic. Cameroon’s 1994 forestry law provided that a share 
(10%) of the annual area tax (determined by an auction 
process) be returned to the local communities. Subsequent 
legislation introduced the principle of paying 1,000 FCFA 
(€1.5) per m3 of logged timber to the communities. These 
regulations are becoming generalised in the Congo Basin. 
Congo’s Decree 5053 (enacted in 2007) provides for the 
creation of Community Development Areas (CDA) as part of 
development plans, such as areas ‘likely to contribute to the 
development of local economies and the fight against pover-
ty’, whose boundary demarcations must consider community 
requirement for carrying out subsistence activities (e.g. agri-
culture and agroforestry, domestic livestock, fisheries and 
fish farming, hunting and gathering). As an extension of these 
specific areas some companies have formed Local Develop-
ment Funds (LDFs), mentioned in the new Forest Code draft 
as an integral part of development plans. They are meant 
to finance micro-projects of community interest and are 
7
 According to the FAO (FRA 2015), Gabon has recorded a +0.2% figure in annual net change of forest area per year between 1990 and 2015. 
FRA 2015 cannot allow to distinguish between North and South Congo (this last displaying more deforestation), but for the entire country 
and the same 1990–2015 period the figure is of only –0.1% per year (against –0.2% for DRC which industrial timber production is around 
300,000 m3 in average against 2 million m3 and more for Congo or Gabon).
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financed through fees of 200 FCFA per m3 on the logged 
volumes. Gabon’s Decree 105, which sets the model for 
contractual specifications, requires the concession-holder to 
sign an agreement with the local people “who live within the 
concession or are local residents”. Article 1 states that “this 
agreement aims to directly benefit the communities with the 
gains from forest logging carried out by the forest concession-
holder in their landholding”. The contribution must be made 
to an LDF, which will finance “projects of collective interest 
identified by the concerned village communities”. 
While, in the Congo, the ‘community’ aspect is clearly 
mentioned among the micro-project eligibility criteria, its 
scope is not clarified (Schmitt et al. 2015). Gabon’s Decree 
105 explicitly refers to a community land (the landholding) 
within the concession where timber is logged and which 
therefore implicitly acts as the basis for the sharing of some 
of the profits.
Rethinking community forestry along a renewed concession 
regime
In Gabon, concession-holders have undertaken to accurately 
map these landholdings8 to serve as a basis for discussion and 
profit sharing with the communities. One of the most success-
ful examples is undoubtedly that of the CEB-Precious Wood 
concession, which worked for several years with sociologists 
and produced a map of the landholdings in 2012 (see below), 
with each landholding corresponding to a village or group 
of villages. 
The boundaries of these landholdings have been defined 
in consultation with the villages concerned. While most of the 
concession is covered by landholdings, some areas are not 
under the village’s influence.9 A CEB document (undated) 
states the following:
“The agreement, a prerequisite to any operation in the 
village area of influence, is formalised by the forest fête 
organised by the villagers and the CEB. The event, a proof 
of the free and informed consent, marks the beginning 
of logging in the landholding of the concerned villages. 
In case of disagreements, logging in the disputed area is 
terminated until discussions between the parties involved 
result in a solution acceptable to all” [the money is not 
given in cash but is used to fund projects and purchase 
of equipment]. 
8
 The term ‘landholding’ (finage in French) we use here refers to the extent of land owned and more or less completely used by an agricul-
tural community. The definition by Henri Mendras (1976, p. 33) can also be mentioned: ‘The term ‘landholding’ designates the area 
occupied and ‘legally’ owned by a community, regardless of the mode of ownership’ (underline added). For its use in the context of Central 
Africa, see Karsenty and Marie (1998).
9
 In these areas, the CEB pays fees to the villages the landholdings of which are not rich in commercial species. The CEB, an FSC certified 
company, pays 300 FCFA per m3 of wood sawn in its factories and 1,000 FCFA for wood sold as logs.
FIGURE 1 Map of village landholdings within the CEB-Precious Wood concession in Gabon (source: CEB & TEREA) 
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in joint ventures between industrial concessions and the vari-
ous beneficiary communities. These overlapping rights must 
be recognised by national legal frameworks. The stabilisation 
of agricultural clearings in landholdings within the industrial 
concessions could be organised as part of the projects carried 
out with external stakeholders, possibly in the form of pay-
ments for environmental services (PES), by transforming the 
profit-sharing mechanism into conditional transfers based on 
the PES base principle.
Community concessions, which require exclusive rights, 
should be formalised after changes are made to the industrial 
concession boundaries in order to identify areas that lack 
viable small businesses. These adjustments would constitute 
the second phase of the promotion of joint concession 
management, encompassing the overlapping rights and the 
exclusive rights of communities. The gazetting of forest man-
agement units, not yet undertaken or completed in 
Central Africa, will constitute the legal process enabling the 
movement of boundaries as per requirements. In short, it 
pertains to organising community forestry (in a broader sense) 
so that it defines two areas:
• An exclusive area in the form of community conces-
sion within the landholding
• An inclusive area identified by maps drawn in consul-
tation with the communities and their neighbours – 
an area that can have boundaries that are precise 
(e.g. rivers, ridgelines) or fuzzy (i.e. with grey areas, 
especially in the case of resource sharing with neigh-
bouring communities within the boundaries). These 
non-exclusive areas can overlap with other statuses 
such as forestry concessions or protected areas and 
be identified in the specifications of companies or 
conservation organisations.
In overlapping areas it is possible to go much further than 
sharing profits from timber logging. Development on the var-
ious ‘included landholdings’ (within industrial concessions) 
for the resource exploitation of subsectors other than timber 
is possible as part of joint ventures between the forestry 
company and each community granted landholding rights. 
Sport hunting can be part of these activities, possibly with a 
specialised operator who would share the profits with the 
communities. The NTFP harvesting and processing subsec-
tors are other resource exploitation options that could benefit 
from the professional company structure and benefit the 
communities, in terms of both jobs and profit sharing. 
One obvious obstacle is the companies’ will and ability to 
develop and support these joint ventures in social contexts 
known to be unfriendly to the establishment of businesses that 
require sustained cooperation among its members. On the 
other hand, the development of the concession toward a new 
and inclusive institutional form may justify the support of 
public development aid, a support the industrial concessions 
currently lack because of the controversies surrounding it.10 
The CEB’s initial project was to share royalties from annual 
logging and pay back a share to the communities in propor-
tion to the size of their landholdings within the concession in 
order to pay more or less steady amounts to the communities 
each year. This was not possible, since the communities 
wanted to be paid the full royalty corresponding to the volume 
taken from the landholding and agreed to not receive anything 
once logging was shifted.
The CEB’s experience is particularly interesting insofar as 
there is a reconnaissance mapping of specific forms of space/
resource allocation that overlap with other rights (that of 
timber logging). While this is a simplified representation 
(the range of controls is not reflected), it is suitable for its 
intended (profit-sharing) purpose and can serve as a basis for 
developing common interests between the company and the 
communities concerning the exploitation of resources other 
than timber.
From mutual exclusion to overlapping: towards an 
inclusive community forestry
Community forests and industrial concessions are generally 
considered mutually exclusive. The idea that forest popula-
tions can have an exclusive area where their rights to 
conduct various activities are guaranteed is the basis of com-
munity forests as we know them in Cameroon. However, 
these forest areas are the geometric realisation of a separate, 
specialised space management model. Focusing only on the 
location of the boundary that would separate a community 
forest from the industrial concession amounts to the zero-sum 
game logic (what one wins, the other loses), without trying to 
coordinate the usage (e.g. commercial timber logging, farm-
ing, harvesting of non-wood forest products, hunting, fishing) 
across all relevant massifs influenced by practices involving 
interaction between the local people and businesses. It is 
precisely the organisation of these different usages of the 
same ecosystem that should be the focus of forest manage-
ment for long-term viability. This requires thinking in terms 
of the coexistence of numerous resource uses before thinking 
in terms of mutually exclusive spaces. These new principles 
form the basis of an inclusive community forestry, which 
encompasses both the traditional community forest (which is 
a community concession) and landholdings within industrial 
concessions. 
From traditional concession to a joint resource management 
institution: proposals for the governance of concessions 2.0
These dynamics can be the starting point for the transforma-
tion of the concession system in Central Africa, with the 
recognition of rights associated with various ‘institutional 
layers’ overlapping within the same area. The overlapping 
spaces may not only be a key element for sharing of benefits 
(which they already are in some cases) but they could also 
become joint management areas (including for the monitor-
ing of ‘outsiders’, poachers, and illegal operators) with the 
development of economic activities other than timber logging 
10
 See, for example, the World Bank’s 2013 Forest Policy Assessment Report from its Internal Assessment Group, which opposes industrial 
concessions in community forests, arguing that they hinder the forests’ development.
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forestlands. FSC certification offers significant incentives for 
such a development, and the mapping of traditional territories 
is considered a possible empowering REDD+ activity.
Proposals for Concession 2.0 governance
A participatory and inclusive governance model could be 
considered along the lines of what has already been tested, 
especially in protected areas in Africa (Roe et al. 2009) and in 
Swedish forests (Carlsson 1997). The idea is to share decision 
making through an institutionalised negotiating platform 
(Borrini-Feyerabend et al. 2000) in which each partner would 
have the right to vote. This would focus on the various 
harvested natural resources, excluding timber. It is important 
to clearly define the decision-making process that would be 
entrusted to this executive process meeting and would remain 
in the hands of the concession-holder under the dual control 
of the state and the negotiating platform.
For a forest concession in Cameroon, for example, this 
negotiating platform (or ‘concession management commit-
tee’) could include a representative of the decentralised struc-
ture of the Ministry of Forests (e.g. Station Head, regional 
authority), two representatives of the forest company (indus-
try and development), a representative worker (union repre-
sentative), a representative of the local residents association, 
a representative of the hunting safari operator (if applicable), 
and representatives of the local resident communities in 
proportion to the percentage of the areas traditionally owned 
by each village within the concession. Where the number is 
unfavourable to certain players, it would be necessary for 
some members (e.g. administration, concession-holder) to 
have veto rights. This meeting could be held, for instance, 
twice a year to decide on the major guidelines for managing 
the concession. Sharing decision making does not imply 
sharing the responsibility of implementing the decisions, 
which would remain in the hands of the legal representatives, 
concession-holder, and competent public administrations. 
The sharing of decision making should be accompanied 
by a local profit-sharing model, resource by resource, possi-
bly financed by timber royalties in favour of the people. 
The same negotiation platform would then determine the 
allocation of the profits to the people, as prescribed by the 
prevailing community management system of the Village 
Hunting Areas of the CAR (Bouché et al. 2011). The negotia-
tion platform shall constitute the place par excellence for 
debate, negotiation, and decision making on the rights to be 
assigned to overlapping areas seeking an operational and 
regular co-management process that determines the duties, 
rights, and responsibilities of each player.
From a participatory perspective, this model clearly stands 
out from Cameroon’s current system – for example, where the 
farmer–forest committees limits participation to consultation. 
The proposed structure grants local representatives access to 
decision making and voting. From a profit-sharing perspec-
tive, it differs from Cameroon’s current Annual Area Fee 
(AAF) system in that the revenues allocated to communities 
would be paid directly at the local level, without being routed 
through the central government, to avoid the diversion of 
FIGURE 2 Potential dual dimension diagram of community 
forestry: landholding overlapping the industrial concession, 
potential areas for community concession and agroforestry
The recognition of rights on landholdings helps in consider-
ing the introduction of PES, which could both remunerate 
the beneficiaries for the conservation and control (against 
outsiders) of their ‘inclusive landholdings’ and contribute 
funds for investments in the reforestation and restoration of 
the degraded areas. The PES oriented toward investment 
(Karsenty 2015) could also assist in establishing perennial 
crops (e.g. cocoa, palm oil) in some deforested areas of the 
‘included landholdings’ in agreement with the company, 
which could help market these agricultural products. In a 
word, that is what we call ‘Concessions 2.0’. 
To enable this development toward ‘concessions 2.0’, 
legal frameworks could be adapted and made consistent. 
Zoning policies based on a strict specialisation of lands 
should be reviewed toward a more balanced approach to help 
in the management of overlapping rights concerning the same 
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some parts of the Cameroonian AAF during the funds’ lengthy 
routing procedure. 
The question of the election of village representatives, 
their accountability, and especially the ability of the people 
to remove them in case of negligence shall remain crucial, 
however, if we are to avoid the excesses observed in the 
management of the Cameroonian AAF (Mbairamadji 2009, 
Yamo 2015). In this context, one might suggest that the 
representatives should be elected for a non-extendible term 
of two years and that the management committee should 
be able to prosecute a member for alleged embezzlement or 
misappropriation. 
In practice: a co-management process to be invented
In practical terms, what changes will the new mode of gover-
nance and the access to other resources bring to the challenges 
faced by the concessions? In agriculture, for example, the 
taboo on agricultural encroachment zones could first be lifted, 
and these areas should be recognised and mapped. The next 
step for the management committee would be determining the 
joint management arrangements, such as the demarcation of 
agricultural areas not to be overstepped, support for agricul-
tural intensification, cooperation for the evacuation of prod-
ucts, reforestation methods, and incentives for developing 
crops that maintain forest cover. For commercial hunting, 
the terms negotiated with the representatives of the local 
communities will help identify the illegal settlements and 
schedule their eviction (necessary to help develop regulated 
joint economic activities). The economic partnership around 
this new economics and the sharing of profits should encour-
age strict compliance with the conservation areas and joint 
monitoring with the people, as is already the practice in many 
protected areas. These are but a few examples; each case 
will have to receive a negotiated practical solution based 
on an agreement binding the parties in terms of rights, 
responsibilities, and sanctions.
Artisanal sawing is a remunerative activity typically 
performed outside of regulations.11 The pit sawyers compete 
with the industry for the logging of the same species, and their 
integration into the Concession 2.0 system does not seem 
realistic. It is unlikely that the artisans will be satisfied with 
the wood discarded in the logging areas, and it is unrealistic 
to expect that concessionaires will ensure that these artisans 
will restrict themselves to performing legal activities (includ-
ing the payment of taxes) in the concessions. However, the 
community concessions are an appropriate framework for the 
deployment of the artisanal loggers’ activities and for their 
formalisation in a more favourable regulatory framework.
Potential hurdles are numerous, starting with the difficulty 
of building mutual trust between industrial concessionaires, 
the communities and the local authorities in an often conflic-
tual context about land use, hunting regulations and fulfill-
ment of social specifications by the companies. Joint ventures 
between communities and companies might prove difficult to 
establish and make them economically viable. Companies 
might be reluctant to invest into mapping, joint ventures and 
to enter into inclusive governance processes without external 
financial support. Governments might be reluctant to recog-
nise customary territories within gazetted forests, as they may 
perceive the process as threatening State ownership. 
However, the concept draws upon recent dynamics devel-
oping with the incentive of forest certification and recent 
changes in legislations. Implementation might be less diffi-
cult in countries such as Gabon and Republic of Congo, where 
such changes in legislation have begun and where advanced 
concession holders have experimented the coupling between 
mapping and benefit sharing.
Box 1: Concession 2.0 and Indonesian KPH: how do they compare? 
Since 1999 in Indonesia, the Forestry Law (Law 41/1999) stipulates that Forest Management Units (KPH for the Indonesian acronym) 
would be established not only in production forest, but covering all forest areas and functions. Establishment, in practice, has been 
neglected until 2007 when two Government regulations speed up the process. As stated by Suwarno et al. (2014:42) “KPH is a forest 
management strategy with the dividing of forest land area into management area units based on certain criteria”. In practice, “the 
Minister will allocate and stipulate certain areas for developing Community Plantation Forests (HTR), Community Forests (HKm) 
and Village Forests (HD) based on a proposal from the FMU” (Kartodihardjo et al. 2011). KPH shares with Concessions 2.0 concept 
the concern for communities’ rights: (“the implementation of each component of forest management must consider the community’s 
cultural values, aspirations and perceptions, as well as pay attention to the people’s rights, and must therefore involve the local com-
munities”, (Kartodihardjo et al. 2011) and the idea of multiple use of the forest area (“Forest utilisation includes: area utilisation, 
environmental services utilisation, timber forest product utilisation, non-timber forest product utilisation, forest product collection”, 
Kartodihardjo et al. 2011). 
But KPH regulations do not mention timber benefit sharing, mapping and recognition of customary rights within the industrial 
concession, nor economic joint venture and shared governance. The basic difference is that KPH is a juxtaposition of tenures onto 
a landscape with a public administration/coordination, while the Concession 2.0 concept is about managing overlapping tenures 
and valorisation of multiple resources under the supervision of a private entity. While KPH are oriented toward land sparing, the 
Concession 2.0 concept pertains to the land sharing logic.
11
 Which is usually inadequate and requires changing (Lescuyer et al. 2012), but that is another discussion.
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CONCLUSION: REFORMING LAWS AND INVESTING 
IN AN INNOVATIVE INSTITUTIONAL PROCESS
Current forest codes allow timber logging only in forest con-
cessions. People are allowed to exercise only the traditional 
rights of use but not to develop market channels for non-wood 
products. A change in legislation enabling the concession-
holder to form joint structures for the commercial harvesting 
of non-wood products along with the communities that are 
stakeholders in the management of the concession are thus 
required. This would mean recognising new rights (mainly 
over land and resources, given that different people may hold 
different real rights on the same asset) for communities, 
which poses the problem of their legal form. In the DRC, the 
2014 decree on the allocation of forest concessions to local 
communities allows the allocation of forests without the legal 
form of the community being formally established, but it 
requires that logging operations be preceded by the establish-
ment of an association, a cooperative, or a local development 
committee (i.e. structures that can benefit from a legal form). 
Such a structure could inspire changes in the laws of other 
countries: the self-defined community is recognised as having 
real rights over its entire landholding, while the joint-venture 
harvesting operations in non-wood products or perennial 
plants are preceded by the creation of a community trade 
association structure.
One of the conditions for implementing Concession 2.0 is 
that a significant investment be made in the participatory 
mapping work of community landholdings in forest areas, 
with priority given to areas overlapping with industrial 
forestry concessions. Some forest companies have already 
undertaken this mapping work in their concessions, but it is 
necessary to map all the landholdings – including the areas 
outside the concessions. Only a handful of companies are 
involved in this process, and it is unlikely that the other com-
panies will do so spontaneously, especially without financial 
aid. The work done by NGOs and the work mentioned above 
may constitute a beginning, but mapping within the conces-
sions will have to be done in cooperation with the logging 
companies. The announcement made in September 2015 
regarding the creation of the Central African Forestry Initia-
tive (CAFI), which aims to invest up to 500 million USD in 
forest programmes, is a major opportunity to change the scale 
of the participatory mapping of landholdings and provide 
support and assistance to the institutional process leading to 
concessions 2.0.
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